Experimental methods to corruption

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Abstract: This paper aims to analyze corruption in laboratory conditions. This is one of many methods that can be used in the research “what the corruption is, how it manifests itself and who is most interested in corrupt practices”. This is a relatively new method that is indeed challenging, however, can bring a new perspective to the problem. For a better understanding of how the currently sees the corruption, the article deals with the actual definitions of corruption and its typologies. Typology just influences the perception of corruption as such

Keywords: corruption, typology and level of corruption, experimental methods,

1. Corruption – the state of arts

There are numerous definitions of corruption in the academic literature and among donor agencies. Most of these definitions are quite broad, and often somewhat vague (Knack, 2006). Before we introduce some of them it is important to stress the following fact. There is an opinion that corruption can be defined. Yet there are a number of problems with defining corruption.

Firstly, corruption is an umbrella term for a wide range of complex phenomena, characterized by betrayal of trust, deception, and deliberate subordination of common interests to specific interests, secrecy, complicity, mutual obligation and camouflage of the corrupt act (Alatas, 1990, pp. 1–2, cited by Lebedeva, 2009, p. 70). This makes it difficult to find a simple formula relevant to all of them (ibidem).

Secondly, corruption is not a new phenomenon. It is present throughout the entire human history and plays a role in both the downfall and the development of societies. In a very general way, Brooks refers to corruption as ‘the intentional misperformance or neglect of a recognized duty, or the unwarranted exercise of power, with the motive of gaining some advantage’ (quoted in Alatas, 1990, p. 1, cited by Lebedeva, 2009, p. 70-71).

Corruption is a phenomenon, which is based on an effort to establish a new set of corrupt norms inside such institutions affecting policymaking, administrative procedures, public procurements, and the behavior of employees etc. In spite of the fact that impacts of systemic corruption on the areas of government, civil freedoms, social cohesion, and public economy are well known, there is very little practical
research involving concrete evidence of systemic corruption in particular cases (Langr, 2014).

Corruption is considered as amoral practise (Okogbule, 2004), however it has become a widespread phenomenon in many countries of the Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) including the Czech Republic (see e.g. Lı́zal and Kocenda, 2001; Zuzowski, 2004; or Wallace and Latcheva, 2006).

Economics often define corruption as the “breaking the rules for private gain” (Lee & Guven, 2013, Budima 2006) or as the “misuse of public office for private gain (Paldam, 2002). Corruption has been also defined as “the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests” (Kaufmann, 2010) and people involved in corruption are often public officials and politicians, who control, the power of public office (Nguyej, Dijk, 2012).

Corruption can be also viewed as a tax on the profits of the productive sector which allows entry into the market for the new products and technologies which require an initial fixed costs or investment (Murphy et al., 1991). There are three prerequisites for corruption: bureaucratic discretionary power, the association of this power with economic rents and deterrence as a function of the probability of being penalized (Jain, 2001).

Corruption is bad and it must be distinguished from “giving a present”. That might be considered as corruption in less developed countries (Tanzi, 1998).

Some researchers suggest that there are approximately 70 individual indicators of corruption (Standeart, 2013). The two most used aggregated indicators are CPI (Corruption Perception Index made by Transparency International) and WGI (Worldwide Governance Indicators’ index of corruption made by the World Bank) (Standaert, 2013). One group of authors use these two aggregated indicators for their research. Than is here a second group of authors that make their own research.

We can find studies which deal with research of determinants of corruption. Authors Ades and Di Tella (1999) represent these major determinants: rent seeking opportunities and corporate competition, legal effectiveness (e.g., Herzfeld and Weiss, 2003), and legal origin, religion, and status of economic development (e.g., Paldam, 2002).

1.1. Typology of corruption

Corruption might influence the society in a number of ways. Because there is no universally accepted definition of corruption, there is no universally valid typology of corruption (Vargas-Hernández, 2011). Firstly is it good to realize that we can speak about active or passive corruption depending on who requires some form of corruption or who is approached. About this division also speaks Vargas-Hernández (2011). The basic attributes of corruption might be classified as follows:

1) Corruption according to the location (Klitgaard and Maclean, 2000):
   • Internal corruption (amongst public servants),
   • Political corruption (entanglement of politics with the private and business sector),
   • State-level corruption (corruption emerging from handling the public property),
   • Public sector corruption (e.g. law enforcement agencies, judicial system, etc.)
   • Private sector corruption (interconnected to the public sector corruption),
   • Mass media corruption (manipulation of information)
   • Municipal level corruption (e.g. autonomous regions, majors, etc.)
2) Then we can distinguish corruption according to the form (e.g. Batory, 2012; Maurob, 1995; or Besley and McLaren, 1993):

**Nepotism** - is corruption behaviour which lies in favouring the family members within the employment, however when the company is given to family members to run and own, this is called “family business” and does not have traces of nepotism.

**Clientelism** - favouring friends, relatives or interest groups, very often happens through favouring the companies that supported the given firm in the past – overall, this is a very widespread form of corruption.

**Bribery** is another widespread form of corruption. One of the most widespread form of corruption. It has been estimated that worldwide bribery involves some $1 trillion per year, or 3% of global income (Beekman, Bulte & Nillesen, 2014, p. 37).

**Lobbing** - (very negatively perceived activity in the Czech Republic, used to be called “the clash of interests”, a definition which is now non-existent).

As it was mentioned above there are several categorizations of corruption: according to the location, according to the form. Other approach introduced by Vargas-Hernández (2011) defined and divide corruption into the following forms: Bribery, collusion, embezzlement and theft (taking or conversion of money), fraud, extortion, abuse of discretion, improper political contributions and patronage – illegal form of “sponsoring.” (ibidem).

All categorizations and forms of corruption describe corruption from different angles and points of view. However, the question is, if these categories are necessary in concrete research situation. In many cases it is truly difficult to get an overview of the topic For someone it could be difficult to orientate in this amount of corruption’s types. According to our research experience is good to know what form of corruption or what corruption according to the location it is. It could make their research simpler and much more transparent. In other words, authors agree with the distribution of corruption by location and by form. But categorization by Vargas-Hernández (2011) is not significant for researchers and can confuse people.

Apart from these three types one can distinguish corruption in context of globalization (Zekos, 2004).

Some authors discussed aspects of corruption in the philosophical context and then we could speak about “moral corruption”, corruption of principles, corruption of people, corruption of organisational and corruption of states (see e.g. Zekos, 2004, Dion, 2010).

As it was discussed above, there have been a number of attempts at defining corruption, corruptibility and other related terms. Most of these definitions are quite broad, and often somewhat vague (Knack, 2006).

Economists usually define corruption as the “breaking the rules for private gain” (Banerjee, Mullainathan & Hanna 2012, Lee & Guven, 2013, Budima 2006) or “misuse of public office for private gain (Svensson, 2005). Corruption is considered as amoral practise (Okogbule, 2004).

In general corruption can be defined „as a specific behavior that is not accepted by society.” In addition to these, as has been mentioned above, there is a need to distinguish corruption from “giving a present”. This is a very important point about corruption, especially in the area of marketing, when attention is often using to keep and to satisfy customers.
Moreover, we can see that there are few types of corruption. This fact can cause problems with the determination what behaviors can be defined as corrupt and what behaviors could be seen as normal.

1.2. Level of corruption

Researchers on corruption have elaborated multiple classifications. Firstly is possible to tell about corruption on country level and firm level (Dijk and Nguyen, 2012). Corruption on the firm-level was also called organizational corruption. This type of corruption could be committed for both, personal gain as well as for organisational gain (Aguilera and Vadera, 2008, Dion, 2010). These authors (Aguilera and Vadera, 2008) presented three types of organisational corruption: procedural corruption, schematic and categorical corruption.

Corruption is presented on the high level as well as on the low level of bureaucracy (e.g. Alemann, 1995) has proposed the following corruption’s levels – vertical and horizontal levels of corruption (more information in table 1).

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<th>Vertical level</th>
<th>Horizontal level</th>
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<tr>
<td>Low level</td>
<td>Local politics</td>
<td>Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle level</td>
<td>Regional politics</td>
<td>Agencies of economic development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Macro level</td>
<td>State’s politics</td>
<td>Military procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mega level</td>
<td>International politic</td>
<td>Secret service</td>
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Authors agree that classification on country level and firm level corruption is significant point for researchers. Corruption on both levels could have little bit different attributes.

2. Research on corruption

As it was discussed above, corruption is a widespread issue and many authors deal with this topic in their scientific papers.

Researchers are trying to define and provide analyses at different levels and from different points of view. There is still a lot of questions how to define corruption and how to fight corruption. From this perspective is quite difficult to provide serious and sophisticated research on corruption. Nevertheless, there are several institutions and researchers who are trying to do so. There is a wide space for using qualitative and quantitative research to collect significant data or information. Nevertheless, there are several limitations to rich significant information and data from the research. As a good way to overcome these barriers, is to provide longitudinal research. During this longitudinal research scientist can engage social, economic and psychological knowledge to establish contact and to get the information.

Corruption, or the misuse of public office for private gains, is an overarching concern in many countries - especially developing ones (Beekman, Bulte & Nillesen, 2014, p. 37).
The World Bank Institute estimates 25% of African states' GDP is lost due to corruption each year (cited in Sequeira, 2012, p. 145, in Beekman, Bulte & Nillesen, 2014, p. 37). Corruption is often considered as symptomatic for deeper-seated problems of weak governance - one of the key factors responsible for underdevelopment in large parts of the world, such as Africa (Beekman, Bulte & Nillesen, 2014, p. 37).

Corruption is by nature an illicit and secretive activity. As a result, it is virtually impossible to observe and measure directly. This lack of hard data partially explains the absence of rigorous empirical analyses of corruption prior to the mid 90's. (Armantier & Boly, 2008). Also our research experience in the field brings the understanding, that accessibility to information on companies and manager's willingness to share information is very limited. This is why is important to build good relationships with companies and key stakeholders, if you want to have an access to the information.

One of the solutions could be “new” research designs from quantitative methodology, which have been unusual during the last 30 years in the area of corruption. As an example of truly exact design is laboratory experiment. According to Armantier & Boly (2008) the experimental approach to corruption may be considered as a very promising approach.

The experimental approach to corruption is the most recent, with the first published paper dating back to the beginning of the decade (Frank, & Schulze, 2000, cited by Armantier & Boly, 2008, p. 6).

The bulk of these experiments have been conducted in the laboratories where two forms of corruption have been studied: embezzlement and bribery (ibidem). While embezzlement experiments build on dictator games to study corruptibility in a single decision making, bribery experiments build on the trust game literature to study corruption in a strategic environment. Laboratory research can be a useful tool. The main goal is to study determinants of corruption behavior and to evaluate different anticorruption politics and behaviors. It has some limitations, but can bring different insight into the area of corruption research (e.g. Armantier & Boly, 2008; Cameron, Chaudhuri, Erkal & Gangadharan, 2010).

Serra & Wantchekon (2012, p. 4) pointed out, that the illegality and secrecy of corrupt transactions make any attempt to quantify their occurrence especially challenging.

Nevertheless, in the last two decades empirical research on corruption has proliferated (ibidem). Until very recently, the standard approach to measuring corruption has been to employ country-level corruption perception indexes based on surveys of ordinary citizens or businessmen, or to rely on experts’ assessments (Serra & Wantchekon, 2012).

Since the seminal work by Mauro (In Serra & Wantchekon, 2012), which investigated the relationships between corruption and economic growths cross-country regression analysis, an increasing number of studies correlating country-level perceived corruption with economic, political, and sociocultural variables have emerged. While these studies (Maoros’ studies) have certainly contributed to our understanding of the relationships between corruption and important country aggregates, their biggest limitation lies in the inherent bias in measuring corruption through perception indexes, and the difficulty in identifying causal effects when employing observational data that is subject to endogeneity bias (ibidem). In the last decade, the application of experimental methods to the study of corruption has allowed researchers to address both the measurement and endogeneity problems constraining the results obtained by previous studies (Serra and Wantchekon,
Indeed, experimental research has led to significant advances in our understanding of both how corruption occurs and how potentially corrupt individuals respond to different sets of monetary and nonmonetary incentives (Serra and Wantchekon, 2012).

3. **Types of Experiments in the field of corruption**

Harrisson & List (2004, p. 121 - 122, in Armentier, Boly, 2012) propose to partition experiments into four broad classes (table 2):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type or class of experiment</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>A conventional lab experiment</td>
<td>employs a standard subject pool of students, an abstracts framing, induced valuations, and an imposed set of rules.</td>
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<tr>
<td>A framed experiment</td>
<td>is conducted with field context in the commodity, the task, or the information set that the subjects can use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An artefactual experiment</td>
<td>employs nonstandard subjects in the laboratory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A natural field experiment</td>
<td>takes place in the field with the subjects unaware that they are taking part in an experiment. According to Harrison and List (2004) a natural field experiment generates data that are closest to naturally occurring data, and therefore exhibits the highest degree of external validity among the four types of experiments Harrisson &amp; List (2004, p.121 - 122).</td>
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A **conventional lab experiment** employs a standard subject pool of students, an abstracts framing, induced valuations, and an imposed set of rules.

A **framed experiment** is conducted with field context in the commodity, the task, or the information set that the subjects can use.

An **artefactual experiment** employs nonstandard subjects in the laboratory.

A **natural field experiment** takes place in the field with the subjects unaware that they are taking part in an experiment. According to Harrison and List (2004) a natural field experiment generates data that are closest to naturally occurring data, and therefore exhibits the highest degree of external validity among the four types of experiments Harrisson & List (2004, p.121 - 122). The question is how often and how accurate researchers can design a natural field experiment and then verify the findings in the same or similar conditions.

3.1. **Lab experiments on corruption**

Corruption and corruptibility - due to their illegal and therefore secretive nature - are difficult to assess either with traditional tools such as hard data on criminal convictions or soft data elicited through opinion polls, questionnaires, or case(s) studies (Dušek, Ortmann & Lízal, 2004, p. 2).

Laboratory experiments in general have been used increasingly, and successfully, as the method of choice by economists to understand a plethora of design and implementation problems ranging from the analysis of matching mechanisms in a variety of labor markets (Ortmann & Lizal, 2004).

Economists have studied corruption since at least the early 1970s; the experimental approach to corruption is recent and not yet fully mature (Armentier & Boly, 2011, p. 1072).
To date, most experiments have been conducted in the lab in order to test bribery deterrents (e.g., penalties, better wages) and identify micro-determinants of corruption (e.g., gender) (Armantier & Boly, 2011, p. 1072).

The increased and successful use of experiments has three drivers (Dušek, Ortmann & Lízal, 2004, p. 3-4):

First, laboratory experiments allow researchers to control the behavior of subjects in ways that are typically not possible in the field.

Second, laboratory experiments allow to systematically manipulate the environment and the resulting behavior changes and hence to address the issue of causality in ways not possible in field contexts.

Third, it is often less expensive to test alternative institutional arrangements (e.g., subtle differences in auction procedures for public procurement projects) in the experimental laboratory rather than in the laboratory of real life (Dušek, Ortmann & Lízal, 2004, p. 3-4).

For these reasons, laboratory experiments on corruption, corruptibility, and measures to fight them, seem self-suggesting (Dušek, Ortmann & Lízal, 2004, p. 17-18).

3.2. Experimental economics can be useful in the following situations (Armantier & Boly, 2008):

When naturally occurring data are scarce, or do not vary along certain desired dimension. This is the case with corruption which is difficult to observe directly, and which is rarely observed under different wage, monitoring or punishment structures.

To identify the micro-determinants of behavior. There is still an open question, which micro-level factors explain corrupt behavior. In the laboratory experiments a researcher can control the experimental design and the characteristics of the subjects’ population, which provides a unique framework to identify the micro/determinants of behavior.

Experiments in laboratory have proved to be a useful first step in the area of policy-making when a trial-and-error approach is very expensive or there is no possibility to implement in the field (ibidem).

At the same time the experimental literature on corruption is in its first decades of development and its practical relevance will not be fully established as long as the question of external validity remains unexplained. There is a need to evaluate the extent to which the results of corruption experiments obtained in the laboratory can be applied or extrapolated to real-life situations in the field (Armantier & Boly, 2008). In the following paragraph this topic will be discussed.

There are at least five features that may differentiate a conventional lab experiments on corruption from actual corruption in the field (Armantier & Boly, 2012, p. 118 - 119):

First, the stakes in the lab might differ from those in the field. In lab experiments, the stakes are essentially limited to “free money” provided by the experimenter. In the field, one of the parties is entitled to the money, and the stakes may not be purely monetary. In addition corruption in the field may have moral and social implications that may be difficult to replicate in the lab.

Second, the game played in the lab and in the field may be different. Following the standard methodology for lab experiments, the corruption game is often played in the lab between anonymous subjects in a context-free environment. In the field, corruption typically involves parties who can identify each other and whose decisions may have lifelong consequences. Furthermore, the context in which
corruption occurs in the field is usually heavily loaded with negative, immoral connotations.

Third, the players may be different in the lab and in the field. In the lab, the roles of briber and bribe are typically assigned randomly to a self-selected group of students. In contrast, the distribution of roles in the field may be endogenous. For instance, it is possible that official has learned to become corrupt, or that they have deliberately chosen their professions because they are intrinsically more corruptible. Conversely, professionals in the field may be less tolerant toward corrupt activities as they are more aware of the negative consequences of corruption.

Fourth, in contrast with the field, lab subjects know that their decisions are being scrutinized. In this context, it has been argued that lab subjects could be inclined to make the “moral” choice when morality and wealth are competing objectives, as it is the case with corruption.

Fifth, while lab experiments are typically conducted in developed countries (where more labs are located), understanding and fighting corruption are generally considered a priority for developing countries. These lab experiments may therefore fail to capture the relevant norms and cultural context necessary to understand and combat corruption where it arguably matters the most: the field of developing countries (ibidem).

4. Findings on corruption

In the following we will present chosen research findings from the experiments on corruption and corruptibility:

**The welfare** - reducing effects on third parties hardly affect corrupt behavior (Dušek, Ortmann & Lízal, 2004, p. 17 - 18). This finding suggests that clean-hands campaigns or attempts to change the public sense of propriety through advertising in metro and trams are not likely to be successful in curbing corruption (ibidem).

**The role of deterrence** - a deterrence effect is found in staff rotation (Armantier & Boly, 2008, p. 6), as well as in monitoring and punishment (Armantier & Boly, 2008, p. 6). Increasing the probability of detecting bribe giving and bribe-taking and the size of the punishment does by and large restrain corrupt behavior (Dušek, Ortmann & Lízal, 2004, p. 17-18).

**Gender effects** - Frank and Schulze (Armantier & Boly, 2012, p. 131) in their original experiment found that the propensity to take bribes is no different for men and women. This result is consistent with those obtained by Rivas (2008) in her conventional lab experiment (ibidem). Moreover, women in Frank and Schulze (2000) appear to be significantly less likely to accept a bribe when there is a small chance that the corrupt transaction may be detected (Armantier & Boly, 2012, p. 131). The authors attribute this result to the common finding that women are more risk averse than men (Armantier & Boly, 2012, p. 131). The results in Frank and Schulze (Armantier & Boly, 2008, p. 6), as well as Armantier & Boly (2008) suggest that women may be less corrupt than men, although (Armantier & Boly, 2008, p. 6) suggest that the effect may depend on cultural factors. Likewise, tolerance with respect to corruption may differ across cultures (Cameron et al., 2006 in Armantier & Boly, 2008, p. 6) and subject tool (Armantier & Boly, 2008, p. 6) Finally, the use of loaded instructions does not appear to generate a treatment effect (Armantier & Boly, 2008, p. 6).

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1 In contrast with several lab experiments, Armantier & Boly (2011) didn’t find any evidence that gender influences the bribe acceptance. Unlike men, however, women seem to respond to monitoring and punishment by failing the briber more often (Armantier & Boly, 2011, p. 1081)
The influence of wages on reducing corruption was also in focus. Higher wages of officials do reduce corruption, but only when officials face the risk of detection and punishment (e.g., Frank & Schulze 2000, Schulze & Frank 2003; Azfar & Nelson 2003; Barr et al. 2003; but see Abbink 2002, in Dušek, Ortmann & Lízal, 2004, p. 17-18). Higher wages reduce corruption through the risk of losing a well-paying job if detected, an argument well-known from the literature on efficiency wages. Increasing wages without subjecting the officials to the risk of punishment does not appear to induce sufficient loyalty to reduce the amount of corruption (Dušek, Ortmann & Lízal, 2004, p. 17-18). The results of Barr et al. (2003) suggest furthermore that any increase in wages has to be considerable to affect significant reductions in corruption. Nevertheless research of Barr, Lindelow and Serneels (2004, In Armantier & Boly, 2008, p. 6) as well as Jacquemet (2005, In Armantier & Boly, 2008, p. 6) find a negative correlation between wages and corruption, while no such treatment effect has been detected in other studies (i.e. Schulze and Frank, 2003, In Armantier & Boly, 2008, p. 6).

Authors also analysed if the corruptibility is a function of people’s perception of the pervasiveness of corruption in society (Dušek, Ortmann & Lízal, 2004). The results by (Falk & Fischbacher (2002) in Dušek, Ortmann & Lízal, 2004, p. 17-18) suggest strongly that the extent of corruption in a society is a major determinant of corruptibility.

Dušek, Ortmann & Lízal (2004) in their study also put the following questions: Can skillfully formulated laws and regulations overcome the distant past of a country? How exactly do laws and regulations have to be formulated that stand a chance to effectively undermine the tenacity of the past? The answer to the first question seems affirmative (Dušek, Ortmann & Lízal, 2004, p. 17-18) but also all the evidence that shows that there are systematic treatment effects. The second question requires significantly more realistic modeling than is provided by models of Bertrand price competition. Such modeling seems eminently doable.

Armantier & Boly (2012) in their critical analysis of corruption lab experiments focused on external validity. The authors tackle this important issue by comparing the results obtained in conventional laboratory experiments, which very often employ student samples and abstract framing, which results generated by experiments characterized by a greater extent of “field context,” that is, in order, artefactual, framed, and natural field experiments, following the categorization of Armantier & Boly (2012). The main result of the comparison is that while the levels of corruption differ across the four categories of experiments (conventional lab experiments, framed experiments, artefactual experiments, and natural field experiments, see Harrison & List (2004, in Armantier & Boly, 2012), such differences can be systematically explained by differences in participants’ demographic characteristics (age, religiosity, culture etc.). The experimental results suggest several micro-determinants of corruption (Armantier & Boly, 2011, p. 1087).

Moreover the direction of the treatment effects seems consistent across the four types of experiments (ibidem). Finally, Armantier & Boly (2012) report results from the only study that was designed to directly test for the lab-field generalize ability of laboratory experiments on corruption. The results are encouraging: the direction and magnitude of most treatment effects obtained in the lab and in the field, after controlling for differences in the characteristics of the participants, are statistically indistinguishable from one another (ibidem).

Corruption experiments conducted in the lab in Montreal (Canada) and in the field in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) bring interesting results about the micro-determinants of corrupt behavior (Armantier & Boly, 2008, p. 21). In particular,
authors find that the probability to accept a bribe decreases with the grader’s age, religious fervor and ability at the grading task. In addition, their results suggest that women may be more responsive to monitoring and punishment (Armantier & Boly, 2008, p. 21).

Armantier & Boly (2008) find that the direction and the magnitude of several treatment effects to be indistinguishable between the lab and the field. In particular, increasing the grader’s wage reduces the probability that he will accept the bribe in both environments. In other words, authors do not identify intrinsic differences between the two environments, in the sense that the behaviors of individuals with identical observable characteristics are not statistically different in the field and in the lab (Armantier & Boly, 2008, p. 21). This result is encouraging as it suggests that, at least in some dimensions, the results of corruption experiments conducted in the lab in a developed country carry over to the field in a developing country (Armantier & Boly, 2008, p. 21). The outcomes of the experiment, however, differ in some dimensions when conducted in the lab or in the field. In particular, Armantier & Boly (2008) find that doubling the amount of the bribe proposed to the grader has no effect in the lab, while it makes the grader more corrupt in the field. This result could simply reflect the fact that the amount of the increase was different in each environment (ibidem).

In the text above some findings have been presented. Some studies were focusing on predictors or incidence of sociodemographic factors or work conditions, including wages and control mechanisms, others studies worked with more general macro factors as laws and regulations.

At this level of discussion researchers and practitioners can discuss why and to what extent we can make generalizations, but there is still a problem of methodology.

All this studies brought some findings, but there is a big limitation why it is so and what is the root cause. In the list of research findings we introduced some findings, but there is a great need for smart analyses of what type of methodology was used in each research projects and what is the benefit and limitation of each finding.

5. Discussion and Conclusion

The corruption is a problem of most states. It could have form as a firm-level corruption or country-level corruption and both of them have their own specifics. It isn’t easy to say what is the corruption or what is the marketing and research of the corruption is also difficult. There are important good relationships between researchers, stakeholders and businessmen (people from business). From this reason many researchers get used to make researches based on indexes (e.g. CPI, etc.). Experimental methods are new and sophisticated methods in the field of research and can bring new view to this problem.

It is important to say that there is a serious limitation of widespread research in the area of corruption. Accessibility to company information and manager’s willingness to share information could be problematic. Not only private companies, but also organisations and state governments are unwilling to acknowledge the political dimensions that exist behind different decisions (Kavoura, 2007; Kavoura, 2013) which although are not necessarily associated with issues of corruption, they are still unwilling to share.

There is a few possibilities to overcome these barriers. One of them is to build strong and good relationships with companies and key stakeholders, and to work on having an access to the information. Possible way of making a research could be
research on companies (SME's) in the way of case studies (N=1), which has specific pros and cons. Another solution lies in the area of using experimental (lab) approach to corruption. It may be considered as a very promising approach and bring new information about corruption and corruptibility, about socio demographic characteristics of respondents, economic and situational / company conditions, that can stimulate or vice versa suppress the inclination towards corruption. This approach is very useful approach towards corruption and can help in situations, when testing or wide research on companies or regions is limited or from some reasons impossible.

References


